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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2465
________________
CHARLES ISELEY,
                Appellant
   v.
JEFFREY BEARD; ROBERT BITNER; KENNETH KYLER; FRANK GILLIS;
WILMA SEWELL; KANDIS DASCANI; JOSEPH KORT, DIANA
BANEY; PATRICIA EVERHART; PATRICIA YARGER; DAWN MILLS, Physician
Asst.; PAUL ROEMER; MARY SHOWALTER; KILE; CYNTHIA STEVENS; JOHN
SIDLER; PHS, INC.; ASG, INC.; WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES, INC.
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-02006)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 4, 2007
                  Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE AND AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES                   
(Filed:  June 27, 2007 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
2PER CURIAM
Charles Iseley appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of some defendants
and dismissing his action as to the remaining defendants.  We will affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand the matter for further proceedings.
The parties are well-acquainted with the history of this case, so we will recount the
background only as relevant to this appeal.  Iseley is currently incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution (“SCI”) Fayette at LaBelle, Pennsylvania.  He suffers from a
number of medical conditions, including Hepatitis-C (“HCV”), fibromyalgia, chronic
fatigue syndrome, and rheumatoid arthritis.  In 2000, Iseley filed a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.  He alleged, inter alia, that the failure of the defendants to offer him
treatment for HCV constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  In addition, Iseley claimed
that the denial of medical care was in retaliation for having filed grievances and lawsuits
against prison officials and employees.  The defendants in that action included prison
officials from SCI-Mahanoy and SCI-Coal Township, certain prison medical providers,
and the former Secretary of the Department of Corrections (“DOC”).  After the DOC
changed its policy concerning HCV treatment, Iseley unsuccessfully sought a preliminary
injunction to compel the DOC to provide him with prescription drug treatment for HCV,
despite Iseley’s refusals to consent to psychological testing and limited disclosure as
     1 Among the prison medical providers are defendants Dawn Mills, a physician’s
assistant, and Dr. Paul Roemer, a physician.  They were employed by defendant Wexford
Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), the former contractual health care provider at SCI-
Huntington.
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required by the DOC’s treatment protocols.  The District Court granted summary
judgment to the defendants, and we affirmed.  See Iseley v. Dragovich, Civ. No. 00-cv-
04839 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2005), aff’d 90 Fed. Appx. 577, 2004 WL229449 (3d Cir. 2004)
(not precedential).
Meanwhile, in 2002, Iseley filed the complaint in this action, as amended in
September 2003.  He named as defendants DOC officials and employees (both past and
present), SCI-Coal Township and SCI-Huntington officials and personnel,
(“Commonwealth defendants”), prison medical providers from SCI-Huntington,1 again
alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs in denial of treatment for his HCV
while housed at those institutions.  Once again, Iseley’s lawsuit is focused on the
defendants’ denial of medical treatment because he withheld his consent to the
psychological testing aspect of the DOC HCV protocol.  His complaint listed numerous
claims, including that the failure of the defendants to treat his HCV, fibromyalgia, chronic
fatigue syndrome, and rheumatoid arthritis constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; that he was denied medical
treatment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); that the refusal to
treat his HCV was in retaliation for his failure to consent to psychological treatment; and
that he was denied medical treatment in violation of his Equal Protection rights.  Iseley
4also alleged various state law claims.  Iseley sought damages and injunctive relief in the
form of medical treatment.
Iseley filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which the District Court
conditionally granted on March 24, 2004, indicating that the conditional order would be
revoked if counsel could not be found to represent Iseley.  Defendants Mills, Roemer, and
Wexford filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they did not violate Iseley’s
Eighth Amendment rights.  Rather, they contended that Iseley refused to cooperate with
health care providers in following the diagnostic and classification protocols, including
the required psychological screening, as was required of all inmates seeking HCV
treatment.  They also contended that Iseley’s claims were barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.  In support, they cited Iseley’s previous litigation in Iseley v.
Dragovich, supra, asserting that Iseley previously unsuccessfully litigated the identical
issues regarding the denial of HCV treatment, the validity of the DOC HCV protocol, the
psychiatric screening requirement, and the consent form requirement. 
On February 28, 2005, the District Court granted the motion for summary
judgment filed by defendants Mills, Roemer, and Wexford, concluding that collateral
estoppel applied to bar Iseley’s complaint.  In addition, the District Court dismissed the
amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim as to
the remaining defendants.  The District Court denied Iseley’s motions to alter and to
reconsider the judgment.  Iseley appeals.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary
5review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same test applied
by the District Court.  Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 232; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  We will view the facts
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and we will draw all inferences in that
party’s favor. See Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1997).  Similarly,
our review of the District Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under section
1915(e) is plenary.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may
affirm the District Court on any ground supported by the record.  Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Iseley’s HCV-Related Claims
The appellees argue that collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of Iseley’s claims
regarding the denial of HCV treatment, the DOC HCV protocol, and the required
psychiatric screening and consent forms.  For substantially the same reasons stated by the
District Court, we agree.  The District Court considered the factors we have applied in
determining whether collateral estoppel applies:  (1) whether the identical issue was
presented in a previous action; (2) whether the prior action resulted in a final judgment on
the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party
or in privity to a party to the prior case; and (4) whether the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue previously.  See
     2 We specifically noted that Iseley had ample opportunity to litigate his previous case. 
Iseley v. Dragovich, 90 Fed. Appx. at 582, 2004 WL229449, at *3.
     3 Iseley also argues that the Commonwealth defendants should be precluded from
raising collateral estoppel because they attempted to remove to federal court Iseley’s
related state court case, arguing that Iseley’s HCV claims must be addressed in a federal
civil action.  Iseley attached to his brief a copy of the District Court’s order in Iseley v.
Beard,  No. 02-cv-00180 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2002), dated September 30, 2002, denying
removal and remanding the matter to state court.  Iseley states that he voluntarily
withdrew that action and proceeded to file in federal court.  Even assuming Iseley’s
account of this history is correct, we are unpersuaded that the Commonwealth’s collateral
estoppel argument is nullified.  The Commonwealth’s removal petition was filed well
before judgment was entered on Iseley’s claim in the Iseley v. Dragovich matter.
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Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 1991).  With respect to the Iseley v.
Dragovich case, of Iseley’s HCV issues concerning the alleged denial of care relating to
the DOC protocol and screening procedures are identical to the issues presented in Iseley
v. Dragovich, which resulted in a final merits determination.  Iseley was (obviously) a
party to his prior case, and he had a full and fair opportunity in his prior case to litigate
the issue.2  We are unpersuaded by Iseley’s arguments attempting to differentiate the
present case from the Iseley v. Dragovich case concerning his HCV treatment claims.3
Iseley’s Remaining Claims
Iseley argues that the District Court did not address his remaining claims (e.g., the
alleged failures to treat his other illnesses; the alleged violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and his rights under the Equal Protection clause and his state law claims). 
Indeed, it appears from the record that defendants Mills, Roemer, and Wexford did not
argue that these claims were precluded by collateral estoppel in their summary judgment
     4 The District Court’s memorandum identified that the complaint alleged the denial of
medical care for “chronic liver disease and other serious ailments,” and that a “wide range
of medical problems. . . including ‘chronic hepatitis c/cirrhosis’” was at issue.  (District
Court March 24, 2004 Mem. at 1-2.)
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motion, and the District Court’s memorandum does not address the claims as they pertain
to any of the defendants.  Iseley also argues that the District Court should not have
dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim.  We observe that the procedural
history in the District Court proceedings is somewhat puzzling.  For instance, the record
indicates that Iseley paid the filing fee for his civil action and apparently was not
proceeding in forma pauperis.  Yet as noted above, in addition to granting summary
judgment, the District Court dismissed Iseley’s complaint against the other defendants,
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), discussing only the denial of HCV
treatment without a psychological evaluation.  We have noted that section 1915(e)(2)
only applies to litigants proceeding in forma pauperis.  See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10, n.10 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d
1014, 1016-17 (6th Cir. 1999)).  In addition, the District Court conditionally granted
Iseley’s motion for appointment of counsel.  In so doing, the District Court stated that it
had considered the factors of Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 1993), and
found that Iseley’s complaint, insofar as it related to his Eighth Amendment medical
treatment claims,4 had satisfied the threshold requirement of having potential merit. 
(District Court March 24, 2004 Mem. at 3.)  None of Iseley’s other claims are discussed,
and it is unclear whether the District Court differentiated Iseley’s medical claims
8regarding HCV from his claims regarding other ailments.  Because the District Court
record provides no clear indication regarding the disposition of Iseley’s remaining claims,
and in light of the somewhat irregular procedural history, we will remand the matter.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in part
and remand for further proceedings.
